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Making Sense out of Antisense: The
Enablement Requirement in Biotechnology
After Enzo Biochem v. Calgene
MATTHEW D. KELLAM °
INTRODUCTION

The progression of genetic science' in the last three decades has brought with it
medical and technical advances 2 unimaginable to the world prior to the discovery' of
the structure of DNA forty-seven years ago. With the recent advance of countless
new biological discoveries has come the need to examine complex questions of
morality, religion, politics, and economics.4 Included in this need for examination,
and affected by genetic technology perhaps more than any other realm, are the
complex questions raised in the law by these modem technological miracles.5 Genetic
technology has affected nearly every area of the law,6 and one of the areas most
strongly influenced has been patent law.
A good example of biotechnology's influence on patent law is the controversial
attempt at patenting partial sequences of copy DNA ("cDNA") called "expressed
sequence tags"("ESTs"). 7 In 1991, the National Institutes of Health filed patent

* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S. 1997,
University of Notre Dame. I would like to thank my family for their unquestioning support of
everything I have done in my life. I would also like to thank Stanley B. Green for his helpful
comments on the legal aspects of this Note and Dr. Paul W. Huber for his helpful comments
on the scientific aspects of this Note.
1. See generally GEORGE M. MALAClNSKI & DAVID FREIFELDER, ESSENTIALS OF
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY (3d ed. 1998). Biotechnology or genetic technology includes modem
molecular biology techniques that have been developed since the discovery of the structure of
DNA in 1953. Molecular biology focuses upon the form and function of genetic material and
molecular units that act on such material. Id. at 3-5; JAMES D. WATSON ET AL, MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 74 (4th ed. 1987).
2. See id. at 409-37; see also JEREMY RuxKN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY: HARNESSING THE
GENE AND REMAKiNG THE WORLD 15-32 (1998).
3. See Alfred E. Mirsky, The Discovery ofDNA, SCI. AM., June 1968, at,78-88.
4. See, e.g., Ronald Kotulak, TakingLicensewith Your Genes,CI. TRIB., Sept. 12,1999,

at Al; MALACINsIu & FREIFELDER, supra note 1, at 409-37.

5. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (discussing the Court's
conclusion in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), that blood samples used for
genetic forensic tests are a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes); Johnson v. Calvert, 851
P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding the genetic mother and not the gestational surrogate mother to
be the true mother); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)
(discussing property rights of cellular research material extracted from a patient at a hospital);
Comelio v. Stamford Hosp., 717 A.2d 140 (Conn. 1998) (holding that an individual loses her
property right to genetic and cell material when she allows a doctor to remove it); In re
Chattman, 393 N.Y.S.2d 768 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (granting right to an adopted woman to
see her biological parent's genetic history for her own health problems).
6. See supra note 4.
7. ESTs are portions of DNA that have a known sequence but no known function. Until
a function is discovered, the only practical use for the ESTs are as probes to sequence other
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applications for a large number of ESTs and created a storm of controversy
throughout the scientific and legal communities.' The fundamental issue at the heart
of the controversy, at its simplest level, was whether a DNA sequence with an
unknown function could be patented.' Many opponents of the ESTs patent
application argued that until researchers discovered what gene the DNA encoded, a
patent of the naked DNA sequence would be premature. The ensuing litigation and
large amounts of legal commentary 0 concerning the ESTs patent issue has done much
to shape patent-law doctrine.
Although ESTs technology has been at the forefront of the patent debate for the last
decade, another technology has emerged that shares many of the same problems of
patentability. The technology known as antisense genetic technology is a method of
blocking the expression of specifically chosen genes in an organism." Such a system
has great potential for valuable applications in medical treatment and in countless
other fields." The first major antisense technology litigation concerned its
agricultural applications. 3 Calgene, Inc., an agricultural biotechnology company,
marketed a tomato in which antisense-technology was used to block the gene
responsible for quick ripening, and thus increase the tomato's shelf life. Calgene's
tomato was challenged by Enzo Biochem, Inc., who owned a general patent on
antisense technology.' 4 Enzo failed in its challenge, and not only was Calgene's
tomato found not to infringe Enzo's patents,
but also Enzo's patents were also found
s
to be invalid for lack of enablement.'
This Note will focus on how recent developments in patent-law doctrine affected
this litigation, and what this litigation suggests for the future of patent law in
biotechnology. In particular, this Note examines the enablement requirement of
section 112 of the Patent Act, 6 and the unique problems the enablement requirement

DNA segments. For a technical discussion of ESTs, see Andrew T. Kight, Pregnantwith
Ambiguity: Credibility andthe PTO Utility Guidelines in Light ofBrenner, 73 IND. L.J. 997
(1998); Richard A. Epstein, PropertyRights in cDNA Sequences: A New Residentfor the
PublicDomain, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 575 (1996).
8. See Kight, supra note 7, at 998-99. Incidently, the person at the NIH who attempted
to get the ESTs patented was . Craig Venter. Venter was recently in the news for being the
CEO of Celera Genomics, the leader in the privately funded branch of the Human Genome
Project. See Sharon Begley, Decodingthe Human Body, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 2000, at 54.
9. Kight, supranote 7, at 998-99.
10. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the
Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of PartialcDNA
Sequences, 23 AM. INTELL PROP. L.ASS'NQ.J. 1(1995); MelissaL. Sturges, Who ShouldHold
Property Rights to the Human Genome? An Application of the Common Heritage of
Humankind, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 219 (1997).
11. See MALAcINsKI &FREIFELDER, supra note 1, at 182-83, 429.
12. Id.
13. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Del. 1998), affd in
partand vacated in part by 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
14. Id. at 541.
15. Enzo Biochern, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The enablement
requirement requires a patent applicant to adequately disclose the invention so that others may
practice it. See infra text accompanying notes 38-44.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
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poses to unpredictable arts such as biotechnology. The decision in Enzo Biochem,
Inc. v. Calgene, Inc.'7 signals the Federal Circuit's continued trend of making broad
patent applications difficult to obtain in the biotechnological arts. This Note argues
that the Federal Circuit should not expand the enablement requirement any further
and, in some instances, should loosen the requirements, or else a drastic chilling
effect in biotechnology research investment will occur.
Part I of this Note will give a basic overview of section 112 and the enablement
requirement. Part II will discuss the scientific foundations behind antisense
technology. Part III will examine the specific application of the enablement
requirement to antisense technology inEnzo and discuss the difficulty of applying the
enablement requirement to the biotechnological arts.
I. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 112 AND ITS
ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENT

The power of the U.S. government to grant patents lies in Article I, Sectioh 8,

Clause 8 of the Constitution.'" Demonstrating the importance of patent protection to
the Founding Fathers,' 9 the first Congress passed the Patent Act of 1790 as one of its
first official acts.2 ° Since that time, the Patent Act has continued to be revised and
promulgated to its current form.2' In general, a patent applicant will be successful in
his application only if the patent is novel,' useful, and nonobvious.24 Although

17. 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
18. "The Congress Shall have Power ...To promote the Progress of Science and useful

Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Brian P.
O'Shaughnessy, The FalseInventive Genus: Developinga New Approachfor Analyzing the
Sufficiency of PatentDisclosure within the UnpredictableArts, 7 FORDHAM INTELL PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 147, 155-56 (1996) (calling the provision "a rare instance in which the
Founding Fathers coupled an enumerated power with a specific objective").
19. Thomas Jefferson was the driving force behind the U.S. patent system and could be
considered the father of patent law in this country. He wrote "nobody wishes more than I do
that ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver
Evans (May 2, 1807), in 5 THE WRITINGS OFTHOMAS JEFFERSON 74, 76 (H.A. Washington ed.,
New York, Riker, Thome & Co. 1854). For a discussion of Jefferson's patent philosophy and
his many contributions to the field, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
20. Patent Act of1790, ch. 7,1 Stat. 109-12 (April 10, 1790); seealso RoBERTP. MERGES,
ET Al., INTEL.ECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 126 (1997).

21. Major revisions to the Patent Act occurred in 1836, 1952, and 1982. See MERGES ET
AL., supra note 20, at 126-28.

22. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Novelty requires the claimed invention not to have been
previously practiced in the public domain. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 20, at 168.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Utility requires that the claimed invention have some type of useful
purpose. See MERGES ET AL., supranote 20, at 163-65.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 103. Nonobviousness requires that the claimed invention add something
to the prior art and not simply be a logical expansion of a previous invention. See MERGES ET
AL., supra note 20, at 207.
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these are the three mainrequirements ofpatentablity,25 otherrequirements also exist.26
Of these additional requirements, the disclosure requirement of section 11227 of the
Patent Act has traditionally been important in determining whether to grant a patent.
Recent developments in biotechnology patent law have made the section 112
requirements increasingly important.28
A. Section 112

The basic policybehind the section 112 disclosure requirement is to ensure thatthe
public receives an actual benefit from the applicant's patent.' Granting a patent to
an inventor gives the inventor a limited monopoly in her invention by which she is
allowed to manufacture, use, and sell the invention to the exclusion of all other
competitors for a limited time. In exchange for this economic advantage, the inventor
must adequately disclose his invention to the public in a manner that allows the public
to fully understand the invention.3" In this way, both the public and the inventor
benefit: the inventor gains a competitive economic advantage, and the public shares
in the latest discoveries in the art.
If an inventor was granted a patent without disclosing to the public exactly what the
invention was or how it worked, the inventor would benefit, and the public would not
only remain ignorant of the new discovery, but also would not know if their own
work was infringing on the patent.3 The policy of section 112 is to prevent such
problems. These types of problems arise quite frequently in the biotechnological
arts.32

Section 112 is divided into six paragraphs which detail the requirements for what
is needed in the specifications and claims of a patent application.33 This Note will

25. E.g., United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39,48 (1966).
26. The patent application must also be appropriate subject matter for patent, 35 U.S.C. §
101, and must meet the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. See MERGES ETAL., supra
note 20, at 129.
27. Some commentators consider the disclosure requirement to be part of the utility
requirement. See, e.g., Eisenberg &Merges, supra note 10, at 4; DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM
ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABIRiTY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT §
7.03[6] (1978). Regardless of where the disclosure requirement falls for organizational
purposes, section 112 is the appropriate focus for proper analysis of disclosure.
28. See infra Part III.C.I.

29. See O'Shaughnessy, supra note 18, at 149 (describing a patent grant as a social
contract).
30. See Emanuel Vacchiano, It's a Wonderful Genome: The Written-Description
Requirement Protects the Human Genome from Overly-Broad Patents,32 J. MARSHALL L.

REv. 805, 813 (1999) ("Congress enacted a series of laws that establish a quid pro quo between
an inventor and the rest of society.").
31. See Mark A. Lemley, IntellectualPropertyand ShrinkwrapLicenses, 68 S. CAL. L.

REv. 1239, 1276 n. 168 (1995) ("The effect of [section 112] is twofold: by requiring public
disclosure, the patent laws put the invention unambiguously into the public domain... [and]
help[ ensure that the claim is for no more than the patentee has invented.").
32. See infra Part I.E.

33. The specification describes an invention generally. ROBERTL. HARMON, PATENTS AND
CIRcurr 168 (4th ed. 1998). The claims (that are technically part of the
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focus on the first paragraph of section 112.' The first paragraph of section 112 is
generally considered to have three distinct requirements: written description,
enablement, andbest mode. 5 Thebest-mode36 and written-description37 requirements

specification) provide what is commonly referred to as the "metes and bounds" of the patent
and set up boundaries of the property right conferred by the patent. See generallyid. at 187-88
("It is the claim, not the specification, that distinguishes what infringes from what does not.').
34. The sixth paragraph of section 112 pertains to "means-plus-function" claims and has
been the subject of recent debate. See generally Fidel D. Nwamu, Does Your Claim Conform
to Means-Plus-FunctionFormatunder Section 112, ParagraphSix?: 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar,

Co., 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 189 (1999). However, paragraph six is beyond the scope of this Note.
The second paragraph of section 112 pertains to the claims of a patent and is generally
considered to have two requirements. The claims must "point out what the invention is in such
a way as to distinguish it from the prior art... and to define the scope of protection afforded
by the patent." HARMON, supra note 33, at 187. Although Enzo did raise some possible
paragraph two issues, analysis of paragraph two is-beyond the scope of this Note.
35. See Thomas L. Irving et al., The SignificantFederalCircuitCasesInterpretingSection

112,41 AM. U. L. REV. 621 (1992); O'Shaugnessy, supra note 18, at 159. The text of section
112, paragraph one reads:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
36. The best-mode requirement requires an inventor to disclose the best method ofcarrying
out the invention. MERGESEl AL, supranote 20, at 228. This requirement prevents an inventor
from holding back crucial information needed to best practice the patent, while at the same time
having all of the protections of a successful patent granted to him. The best-mode requirement
ensures that the "bargain" between the inventor and the public remains fair and that the public
is not cheated out of what they deserve by way of disclosure in exchange for the patent
monopoly. Leora Ben-Anii et al., Biotech Patent Law Developments, in FIFTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE FORINTELLECTUALPROPERTYLAW 1999, at 555,578 (PLI Intellectual Prop. Course
Handbook Series No. 573, 1999); GLENN W. RHODES, PATENT LAW HANDBOOK § 1.06[3]

(1997-98 ed.).
37. The function ofthe written description requirement is to ensure that the patent applicant
was actually in possession of the item being claimed at the time the applicant filed. See
RHODES, supra note 36, § 1.06[l]. In Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993), the
Federal Circuit held that a DNA fragment encoding a specific protein was not enabled because
the patent only disclosed a method of obtaining the fragment, not the actual sequence. Id. at
1168. Therefore, the patent applicant had not shown that the actual gene segment was in his
possession. See Vacchiano, supra note 30, at 816-17. In a case with similar facts as Enzo, the
Federal Circuit said a patent disclosing a rat DNA sequence for a gene and claiming the human
sequence failed the written description requirement, because the human DNA sequence was
not in the applicant's possession at the time of filing. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Enablement is closely related to written
description, but in enablement analysis, the possession of the claimed invention is immaterial
as long as the claimed material is "easy" to get from the patent disclosure. But see Janice M.
Mueller, TheEvolvingApplicationofthe WrittenDescriptionRequirementto Biotechnological
Inventions, 13 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 615, 633 (1998) (arguing that Lilly has turned the written

description requirement into a "super-enablement" requirement).
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are not relevant to this Note's discussion of antisense technology.
B. Enablement
The purpose of the enablement requirement is to ensure that the patent applicant
is not claiming more than the patent applicant actually has discovered." In order to
be enabled, a patent specification mustteach one "skilled in the art" to make and use
the invention without undue experimentation.39 The real touchstone of enablement is
whether the patent teaches one of ordinary skill how to practice the invention. The
invention cannot just throw out "a germ of an idea" or a starting point for research.4"
However, the amount of "teaching" needed in a patent depends upon the invention's
complexity, breadth, and predictability.
One of the earliest and most famous examples of a patent failing on enablement
grounds is Samual Morse's attempt to patent the use of any form of electromagnetism
to communicate at a distance. 4' The Supreme Court held this claim invalid because
of its generality: "He claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he
has not described and indeed has not invented ....[T]he claim is too broad."42
Another classic case regarding lack ofenablement concerned an electric company's
attempt to patent "[a]n incandescing conductor for an electric lamp, of carbonized
fibrous or textile material."'43 Citing Thomas Edison's long and laborious experiments
to determine adequate materials for light bulbs, the Supreme Court reasoned that this
patent claim was too broad in its claim of any material capable of being used as a
light bulb filament and held the patent claim was not enabled.'
The enablement requirement is important in two stages of patent protection. First,
the patent applicant must overcome the enablement hurdle during the prosecution
stage of the patent.45 Second, the patent can be challenged for lack of enablement
during patent litigation.46 Many commentators have dismissed the enablement
requirement in the litigation arena as unrealistic.47 However, in the biotechnological

38. See MERGES ET AL, supra note 20, at 216.
39. See Rochelle K. Seide & Janet M. MacLeod, Drafting Claims for Biotechnology
Inventions, in SEVENTH ANNUAL PATENT PROSECUTION WORKSHOP: ADVANCED CLAIM

DRAFrING AND AMENDMENT WRITING 1997, at 353, 431 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 501, 1997).
40. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365-68 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
41. See WILLIAM H. FRANCIS & ROBERT C. COLLINS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT

LAw 431 (4th ed. 1995); MERGES ET AL, supra note 20, at 216.
42. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853).
43. The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 468 (1895).
44. Id. at 473-76.
45. Prosecution of a patent pertains to the process of obtaining the patent from the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office.
46. Litigation of a patent pertains to the process in which one adverse party challenges the
validity or the possible infringement of another party's patent.
47. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Kuester, Effective §102, 103, 112 Defenses: What Can Defendants
Do to Win with Them Today?, in PATENT LITIGATION 1998, at 933,957 (PLI Pat., Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 531, 1998) ("It is normally very
difficult to invalidate a patent for lack of enablement ....
").
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arts, the enablement requirement has become a legitimate factor for invalidity
challenges in patent litigation.
C. Enablement in UnpredictableArts: The Wands Factors
The reason for the enablement requirement's special pertinence to the
biotechnological arts has to do with the intrinsic nature of biotechnology.
Biotechnology is an unpredictable art." The very nature of biotechnology involves
the manipulation of and experimentation with complex genetic systems in living
cells.4 Avoiding trial and error experiments and unpredictable results in this field is
impossible.' Unpredictability in a field has a huge impact on enablement analysis,
because as the predictability ofa field increases, the enablement requirement becomes
easier to satisfy." If a field is predictable, the art disclosed in the specification
becomes easier to practice without undue experimentation and unexpected results.
However, if the field is unpredictable, the patent's teachings willbe harder to practice
successfully, with failure to practice and the need for experimentationbecomingmore
likely.52 High unpredictability in a field makes it increasingly difficult for one of
ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the invention without undue
experimentation.53 Therefore, the more unpredictable the field, thie more difficult it
is to satisfy the enablement requirement.
In Ex parte Forman, the Patent Board of Appeals developed a framework with
which to analyze the enablement requirement in the unpredictable arts.' The Federal
Circuit adopted these factors for their own enablement analysis in In re Wands." The
factors are generally referred to as the "Wands factors" and include:
(I) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or
guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the

48. See In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (discussing the field's
unpredictability); O'Shaughnessy, supra note 18, at 165-66 ("[L]iving materials such as
microorganisms or cultured cells, and other aspects of biochemistry and genetic manipulation
... are generally categorized as among the unpredictable arts."); Seide & MacLeod, supranote
39, at 435 ("Genetic engineering and immunological inventions are considered highly
unpredictable technologies.").
49. See supra note 1.
50. See Kate H. Murashige, Section 102/103 Issues in BiotechnologyPatentProsecution,
16 AIPLA Q.J. 294, 297-300 (1988-89).
5 1. See Seide & MacLeod, supranote 39, at 435 ("In allegedly unpredictable fields ... the
scope of enablement varies inversely with the scope of protection.").
Patents,69
52. See Karen S. Cannady, The WrightEnablingDisclosureforBiotechnology
WASH. L. REv. 455, 461-62 (1994); Ellen P. Winner, Enablement in Rapidly Developing
Arts-Biotechnology, 70 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 608, 608-09 (1998).
53. See In re Vaeck, §47 F.2d 488, 494-96 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Where ... a claimed genus
represents a diverse and relatively poorly understood group of microorganisms, the required
level of disclosure will be greater than, for example, the disclosure of an invention involving
a 'predictable' factor such as a mechanical or electrical element.").
54. Ex parte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546, 547 (Bd. of Patent Appeals &
Interferences 1986).
55. 858 F.2d 731, 737-38 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those
in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth
of the claims. 6
The Wands factors are generally analyzed onlyin the unpredictable arts' and, ifused
at all, are not mandatory but illustrative."
The Wands factors analysis requires an inherent internal balancing. For example,
the quantity of experimentation needed to practice an invention should not be
analyzed in a vacuum; rather, the nature of the experiments and the level of difficulty
should be included in the analysis. 9 Thus in Wands, although a large amount of
experimentation was needed to practice the invention,' the experimentation was not
difficult and was routine in the field, so the patent was held to be enabled. Similarly,
if the claims of a patent are broad enough to encompass a wide range of areas not
described in the specification, then the patent must contain more detailed examples
and guidance. 6' Therefore, a certain amount of flexibility exists within the Wands
factors.
D. Enablement and Biotechnology
The Federal Circuit analyzes the nature of the art when determining enablement.62
Therefore, biotechnology patents must be examined through a field-specific lens. In
Amgen, Inc.v. ChugaiPharmaceuticalCo.,63 the applicant claimed all possible DNA
sequences that would encode for a protein and all of the protein's analogs, while only
describing how to make a few analogs.' The purpose of such a claim was to prevent
a subsequent party from subtly changing the amino acid or the DNA sequence in an
attempt to invent around the disclosed invention. The Federal Circuit stated, however,
that the patent was too broad and not enabled because, although "it is not necessary
that a patent applicant test all the embodiments of his invention," an applicant must
disclose "how to make and use enough sequences to justify grant of the claims
sought."6 The Federal Circuit held that the patent did not enable one skilled in the
art the ability to practice the full scope of the invention.'

56. Id. at 737.
57. See Cannady, supra note 52, at 459.
58. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing
Amgen v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
59. See Cannady, supra note 52, at 460.
60. Somebody skilled in the art would have had to screen 134 hybridomas. Id.
61. Id. at 460-61.
62. Some commentators have noted that "[e]nablement is a peculiarly fact-driven inquiry."
Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 10, at 44.
63. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
64. Due to the redundancy of the DNA code, a known protein and its amino acid sequence
can be coded by a potentially infinite number of DNA sequences. Furthermore, a protein with
a known function can have a large number of subtly different protein relatives that perform
substantially the same function. See generallyMAACINSKI & FREFELDER, supra note 1,at 68,
189-90.
65. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213 (citation omitted).
66. Id.; see also In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558-60 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding patent not
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The Amgen case illustrates the unique difficulties inherent in biotechnology
patents. Namely, the very nature of the protein and genetic properties make claiming
all possible aspects of the invention nearly impossible. This, in turn, greatly reduces
the patent protection of a patent and opens the door to a second party
misappropriating the discovery.
1. Skill in the Prior Art
To circumvent this problem, some patent applicants argue that the preexisting skill
in the prior art provides the information that is lacking in the disclosure. Genentech,
Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S6 7 concerned a patent that claimed a method of producing
human growth hormone.68 Although the specification did not adequately teach the
method, the patentee argued "that the knowledge of one skilled in the art was
sufficient to provide all of the missing information ...

[and] would enable the

69

practice of the claimed method." The Federal Circuit held, however, that the patent
was not enabled, because "[i]t is the specification, not the knowledge of one skilled
in the art, that must supply the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute
adequate enablement."'7 One of the major factors in the Genentech court's opinion
was the patent's nondisclosure of starting materials or conditions under which the
process could be carried out.7 This case and current Federal Circuit doctrine suggest
that skill in the prior art will only be given limited value in enablement analysis.
2. Undue Experimentation
Intertwined with this question of skill in the prior art is the issue of "undue
experimentation." The Wands court clarified that some amount of experimentation
could be tolerated in an enablement determination.7 Obviously, determining if

enabled when applicant claimed all permutations of a DNA sequence coding for a specific
protein, but only disclosing the native sequence).
67. 108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
68. Robert P. Taylor, Section 112 Issues in PatentInfringement Cases, in FIFTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1999, supra note 36, at 33, 50.

69. Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1365.
70. Id. at 1366.
71. See Ben-Ami et al., supra note 36, at 574-76. But see Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that the specification need not
disclose what is well known in the art); D. Benjamin Borson, The Human Genome Projects:
PatentingHuman Genes and Biotechnology. Is the Human Genome Patentable?,35 IDEA
461,487 (1995) (using the "inherency argument" that once a native DNA or part of the DNA
is disclosed, the other forms of the DNA are "inherently disclosed" sufficiently to confer
patentability).
72. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed Cir. 1988) (stating that the key word is
"undue" rather than "experimentation."); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding no "undue experimentation" because challenger did not show
that all of the disclosed alternatives did not work); PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75
F.3d 1558, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating "harmless, inconsequential" errors that anybody
skilled in the art would know how to fix do not make a patent fail on enablement grounds); see
also Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1384 (stating that a patent does not automatically fail the
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experimentation is undue would depend upon who was doing the experimentation;
a highly skilled and experienced scientist could probably achieve favorable scientific
results more quickly than an undergraduate research assistant.
Interestingly, the hypothetical "person of ordinary skill" in enablement analysis is
not assumed to have a complete knowledge of all of the prior art, whereas the
counterpart "person of ordinary skill" in obviousness analysis is considered to have
a perfect knowledge of the prior art.' This distinction puts a patent being attacked for
lack of enablement at a disadvantage because it shifts the assumption of who is
carrying out the experimentation toward the less-expert side of the spectrum.
Therefore, a patentee defendingan invention on enablement grounds is well served
by establishing the "ordinary person skilled in the art" as having as much expertise
as possible. Ultimately, the determination of whether an invention requires undue
experimentation will boil down to an analysis using the Wands factors. 4
3. The Use of Specific Examples
One possible manner to ensure enablement is to include specific examples of a
broadly claimed invention in the specification. The Federal Circuit has encouraged
the use of examples, stating "it is irrelevant whether [the] teaching is provided
through broad terminology or illustrative examples." 5 In In re Goodman,76 the
Federal Circuit held that a single example in the specification was not enough to
enable one with ordinary skill in the art to overcome the problems with the
invention.' There is no strict requirement for including examples in the specification,
but specific examples might be the easiest or only method to adequately describe the
invention. Therefore, as the unpredictability, complexity, and broadness of an
invention increases, the need for examples also increases.
E. Special Concerns in Biotechnology Patents
The goal of an inventor applying for a patent is to claim as much material as
broadly as possible. 8 Of course, if the patent claims too much it is susceptible to
invalidation for lack of enablement" 9 When determining exactly how much to claim
ina patent, the applicant must balance the risk of invalidation against the risk of
claiming too narrowly and not adequately protecting the discovery. In a rapidly
developing technology such as biotechnology, this balancing act becomes extremely
difficult.
In a field such as biotechnology, the patent applicant must make the patent claims
as broad as possible in order to anticipate future technical advances that would

enablement requirement if some experimentation is necessary).
73. See Winner, supranote 52, at 618.
74. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495-96 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that "undue
experimentation" must be analyzed by looking at Wands-type factors).
75. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561-63 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
76. 11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
77. Id. at 1050-53.
78. See MERGES ET AL, supra note 20, at 216.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
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otherwise make the patent useless. 0 Further, if inventors know the art is going to
change quickly and make their patents useless, no economic incentive exists to
develop research in the field.8 A classic example of this phenomenon in the
biotechnology arena happens when a protein is developed through biochemical
processes only to be preempted by a method of making the same protein using much
cheaper and easier methods of molecular biologyS
Assume, for example; a researcher develops a method ofobtaining ahighlypurified
extract of a commercially valuable prolein such as insulin. The researcher can patent
his biochemical method of protein production, but the process will become virtually
useless if a subsequent party develops a method of expressing the same protein by
inserting the DNA sequence into a bacterial expression vector.3 Although both
methods produce the same protein, the genetic expression method is much cheaper
and more efficient at producing large volumes in industrial scales. 4 Therefore, the
original patent will be useless unless its claims are broad enough to encompass all
methods of producing the protein, including the subsequent genetic expression
method.
Claiming all methods of producing the insulin, however, would probably be
considered too broad and not enabled. Thus, the rapidly changing technology will
have made the first patent's teachings obsolete, the resources put into the discovery
will not be recouped, and subsequent researchers will have no economic incentive to
develop similar protein purification methods for fear of similar subsequent
technology preemption. This phenomenon also occurs frequently in instances where
a discovery has the potential to apply to a number of species but has only been
sufficiently enabled in one species, or ifthe discovery has potential in eukaryotic cells
but has only been enabled in prokaryotic cells. 5
Compounding this problem is the date at which enablement analysis is done. Only
the disclosure as of the date the patent was filed is pertinent, and all subsequent
discoveries or data cannot be used to save an otherwise nonenabled discovery. 6 If a

80. See Winner, supranote 52, at 614 ("[If patent protection were... limited only to the
specific embodiment by which the goal was reached, it would be so narrow as to be
commercially meaningless.").
81. See Cannady, supra note 52, at 462.
82. Biochemical methods of protein production generally involve manipulations of the
protein as a whole and of the amino acid sequence. Complicated methods and techniques exist
with which to isolate and purify protein using basically mechanical means (for example,
running the protein through specific filters and cleansing with chemical agents). Molecular
biology methods usually involve manipulating the DNA sequence of the protein and devising
genetic expression systems in bacteria in which the desired protein is expressed in a relatively
pure form, with no need for mechanical methods of purification. See MALACINSKI &
FREIFELDER, supra note 1, at 403-04, RIFKIN, supra note 2, at 18, 111-12 (describing this
phenomenon in the vanilla industry).
83. See generally J. SAMBROOK ET AL, MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL
§ 16.3 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing expression of protein from cloned genes).
84. See PHIN,supranote 2, at 18, 111-12.
85. See generally In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Calgene, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d536 (D. Del. 1998), affd in partand vacatedinpartby 188 F.3d
1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
86. See Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558,1568 (Fed. Cir.
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specification discloses the art for X and predicts the art will pertain to Y, subsequent
discovery that the art pertains to Y is worthless because the discovery came
subsequent to the original application date. Consequently, the inventor will only be
given protection for what he can disclose at the time of the patent application.
Claiming broadly to protect against subsequent discovery preemption is virtually
impossible because of this aspect of the enablement requirement. Inventors are faced
with a truly difficult decision about when to file the patent application: early in order
to protect the existing, limited discovery but yisk being.preempted by inadvertently
teaching a competitor how to make a subsequent broad improvement, or waiting to
get all the needed discoveries in order to enable the patent application broadly but risk
being beaten to the filing date by a competitor." Inventors are faced with a truly
difficult decision about when to file the patent application. If they file early in order
to protect the existing, limited discovery, they risk being preempted by inadvertently
teaching a competitor how to make a subsequent broad improvement. However, if
they wait to file until they get all of needed discoveries in order to enable the patent
application broadly, .they risk being beaten to the filing date by a competitor.
In thebiotechnical arts, numerous balancing considerations exist forboth the patent
applicant and the courts. The patent applicant must attempt to claim as broadly as
possible without claiming so much that her claim will be invalid for lack of
enablement. Further, the researcher must decide if resources should be expended in
developing a potential discovery by balancing the probability of sufficient patent
protection to justify the expenditure against the probability the art will change so
quickly that the patent will become obsolete.89
The courts must balance the policy interest of encouraging research and
development by giving inventors a limited monopoly in exchange for a quid pro quo
against the policy against giving inventors too much protection by allowing
extensively broad claims. If the judicial balance shifts too far on either side of the
spectrum, a chilling effect in research and development will occur. If the courts
protect too much, no incentive will exist to develop the art in the broad claim, because
the original inventor will receive all economic benefits from a second party's
subsequent work. If the court protects too little, the original inventor will have no
incentive to produce the original discovery, because the lack of patent protection will
not allow him to recoup his investment. Both the inventor and the courts have an
extremely delicate balancing act that must be performed with countless subtle factors.
This balancing act is particularly difficult in the unpredictable art of biotechnology.

1990) ("Merely because purer and more potent forms of the... compound might be produced
using later-discovered technology does not necessarily mean that the... patent specification
did not provide sufficient enabling disclosures as of the filing date of the application."); Taylor,
supranote 68, at 51-52.
87. See supra text accompanying note 84.
88. See Cannady, supra note 52, at 475-76.
89. Id.
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II. ANTISENSE

TECHNOLOGY

In order to understand antisense technology, one must have a basic grasp of
fundamental biology. DNA is present in all living cells and provides a set of
instructions for the cell's machinery to use in carrying out cellular processes.9 Of
particular importance, the DNA code instructs the cell how to assemble amino acids
to formthe cell's various proteins.9 Antisense technologyprovides amethodto block
expression of certain unwanted genes by blocking this process.9'
A. Basic Science
DNA is made up of subunits called nucleotides of which there are only four:
adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G), and thymine (T).93 A DNA molecule is made
up of two strands of these nucleotides that are complementary to each other. A binds
opposite to T and G binds opposite to C. 4 Of the two strands, only one strand known
as the "sense" strand actually directs the cellular machinery.9" The other strand is not
read by the cellular machinery and is known as the "antisense" strand.' The antisense
strand merely binds to the sense strand to make a stable molecule.97 In order for the
cellular machinery to read the instructions on the sense strand, the antisense strand
must be temporarily removed to allow the cellular machinery (an enzyme known as
RNA polymerase) access to read the code. If the antisense strand remains bound, the
protein cannot be constructed because the antisense strand blocks the reading of the
sense strand's code.9" Antisense technology is based upon this basic concept.
To understand the particular mechanism for blocking the sense strand, the process
of protein formation must be examined. In normal protein production, the RNA
polymerase temporarily breaks apart the two strands and reads the nucleotide
sequence on the sense strand. The RNA polymerase makes a strand of messenger
RNA ("mRNA") that is complementary to the sense strand." Since it is
complementary, the mRNA strand is basically the same as the recently unbound
antisense strand, with the minor difference of uracil (U) being used in place of T."
The RNA polymerase begins reading at a place known as a promoter and ends at a
place known as a terminator. When the RNApolymerase has finished the process, the
DNA rebinds, and the DNA, in its original bound form, remains in addition to the
new mRNA strand that is basically the same sequence as the original antisense

90. See, e.g., MALAcINSKI & FREIFELDER, supranote 1, at 39-40.
91. Id. at 187-99. "
92. Id. at 182-83, 429.
93. Id. at 27.
94. Id. at 39-46.
95. Id. at 164.
96. Id. at 182.
97. The antisense strand does play an important role in the replication of DNA during cell
division but, for the purposes ofprotein production, does not playany "instruction giving" role.
Id. at 131-33, 163-74.
98. Id. at 174, 182-83.
99. Id. at 174-80.
100. Id.
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strand.'' This first step of protein formation is known as transcription.
The second step in protein formation is known as translation. In translation, the
mRNA strand formed from transcription is read by a second cellular machine (known
as the ribosome).' °2 The ribosome translates the chain of nucleotides into a chain of
amino acids to form the protein (amino acids are the subunits of protein
much like
nucleotides are the subunits of DNA and RNA). ° The ribosome adds amino acids
to the growing chain by following the order of the mRNA's nucleotide sequence."
Each set of three nucleotides in an mRNA is a code for a particular amino acid.
Therefore, if the mRNA reads "AGC" the ribosome would attach the amino acid that
corresponds to that particular sequence (in this case, the AGC codes for the amino
acid serine).' 05
A few particularly important variations of this process occur between eukaryotic
and prokaryotic cells."° In eukaryotic cells, the process is somewhat more advanced
because the mRNA produced in transcription goes through an additional editing
process before the ribosome translates it.'0 7 The eukaryotic mRNA is acted upon by
cellular machinery and certain portions (known as introns) are excised from the
0
mRNA."'
This editing process does not occur in the less complex procaryote cells."°
Also, the procaryote cell does not have a nuclear membrane, so the translation occurs
at substantially the same time and place as transcription."0 In contrast, eukaryotic
cells possess a nuclear membrane, so the mRNA has to be transported outside of the
nucleus into the cytoplasm before the ribosome can translate the mRNA.'
B. Antisense
Antisense technology blocks protein formation by introducing an additional piece
of DNA into the cell." 2 This DNA corresponds to a particular gene that is intended
to be blocked, but the DNA is inverted with respect to the original DNA."' As long
as the promoter region is the same for the original gene and the newly added inverted

101. Id.
102. NEEL A. CAMPBELL, BIoLOGY 325-31 (3d ed. 1993).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 321.
105. Id.
106. Prokaryotic cells are generally single celled bacteria that are very primitive in
organization and function. Eukaryotic cells usually are organized as multicellular organisms,
have a cell wall and multiple cellular organelles, and have much more complex mechanisms
of metabolism. Id. at 121-23. Although the two types of cells are quite different, molecular
biologists generally use prokaryote cells as subjects on which to experiment, and then
extrapolate the findings to the more complex eucaryote cells. See MALACINSKI & FREI FELDER,
supra note 1, at 13.
107. CAMPBELL, supra note 102, at 332-35.
108. Id. at 333-35
109. Id. at 332-33.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See MICHAEL R. CUMMINGs & WILLIAM S. KLUG, CONCEPTs OF GENETICS 538-39 (5th

ed. 1997).
113. See id.
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4
gene, the RNA polymerase will translate both pieces of DNA at the same time.'
However, because the new DNA is inverted, the antisense strand is translated instead
of the sense strand." 5 In effect, this newly introduced DNA has the same effect as if
the RNA polymerase would have translated both strands of the original DNA." 6 In
addition to the mRNA produced in normal transcription, the newly inserted DNA
produces its own mRNA." 7 Just as the sense and antisense strands of the original
DNA are complementary and bind to one another, the strand of original miRNA and
the mRNA product from the newly introduced DNA are complementary. "8 When the
two pieces of mRNA bind to one another, the ribosome is unable to translate the
protein, and expression of the gene is blocked." 9 Thus, antisense technology blocks
protein formation by introducing an extra antisense DNA into the cell, which binds
to the original and obstructs the reading of the original DNA by RNA polymerase or
the mRNA by the ribosome."

Il. ENZO BIOCHEM v. CALGENE
Enzo Biochem, Inc. was the exclusive licensee of a patent claiming a method of
controlling the function of any gene in any cell through genetic antisense.' Calgene,
Inc. obtained its own patent claiming antisense regulation of gene expression in
plants." The Calgene patent was used in the development of Calgene's FLAVR
SAVR tomato, which blocked the gene responsible for ripening and increased the
shelf life of the tomato." Enzo claimed that Calgene had infringed on its patents,
which resulted in Calgdne challenging the breadth of Enzo's claims for lack of
enablement.'24 The district court held that Calgene had not infringed on Enzo's patent
and that parts of Enzo's patents were invalid for lack of enablement. ' The Federal

114. James A.H. Murray & Nigel Crockett, Antisense Techniques: An Overview, in RNA
AND DNA 1, 27-28 (James A.H. Murray ed., 1992).
115. See CUMMINGS & KLUG, supra note 112, at 538.
116. Id.
117. See Murray & Crockett, supranote 114, at 5.
118. Id. at 4.
119. CUMMINGS & KLUG, supra note 112, at 538.
120. See Murray & Crockett, supra note 114, at 4-5, 28.
121. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 536, 542 (D. Del. 1998), aff'din
part and vacated in part by 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
122. Id.
123. Sedid. at 542.
124. Id. at 541.
125. The determination of noninfringement of the Enzo patents raises interesting issues
about the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents allows a finding of infringement
in cases where literal infringement is not found. In Enzo, the district court made a distinction
between "inverted DNA" in the Enzo patent and "cDNA" in the Calgene patent. See id. at 55758. Also, the court reasoned that since the plant (prokaryotic) mRNA contains introns, the
antisense process is fundamentally different than in eukaryotic mRNA. 1d. Scientifically,
neither of these distinctions neccesarily justify a finding that the Calgene patent does not
infringe Enzo's patent under the doctrine of equivalents. Ultimately, since the Enzo patent was
found invalid for lack of enablement, this mistake would not change the ultimate result of the
litigation. The district court's doctrine of equivalents analysis in Enzo, however, provides an

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 76:221

Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 26
A. The Patents
Enzo's '931127 patent included claims for the general invention of antisense
technology,' claims for the method of antisense regulation,129 and claims for cells
which possess antisense technology. 3 Although the Enzo patents claim antisense
technology in both eukaryotic and prokaryotic cells, the Enzo patent application only
provided specific examples of antisense technology with respect to four prokaryotic
genes.' The antisense technology worked well in these four examples, but worked
poorly or not at all when attempted in other prokaryotic and eukaryotic genes. 3 2 This
difficulty in extrapolating the Enzo patent's teachings to other genes was the root of
the problem with the patent and ultimately led to the lack of enablement finding by
the district court.
The prosecution of the Enzo patent was replete with examples of extreme difficulty
and unpredictability of the antisense technology. The scientist responsible for the
Enzo patent, Dr. Masayouri Inouye, reported failure of antisense regulation in ten or
twelve other prokaryotic genes.'33 Furthermore, the antisense regulation of the four
genes given as examples in the patent specification was not always successful when
/

interesting application of the confusing doctrine.
126. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Federal
Circuit did remand a portion of the district court's decision which pertained to Calgene's
demand for attorney's fees. Id. at 1381. The remanded portion of the opinion is not pertinent
to this Note.
127. U.S. Patent No. 5,190,931 (issued March 2, 1993).
128. Claim 1 of the '931 patent reads:
A prokaryotic or eukaryotic cell containing a nonnative DNA construct, which
construct produces an RNA which regulates the function of a gene, said DNA
construct containing the following operably linked DNA segments:
(a) A transcriptional promoter segment;
(b) A transcription termination segment;
(c) A DNA segment;
whereby transcription of the DNA segment produces a ribonucleotide sequence
which does not naturally occur in the cell, is complementary to a ribonucleotide
sequence transcribed from said gene, and said nonnaturally occurring
ribonucleotide sequence regulates the function of [the] gene.
Enzo, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
129. Claim 3 of the '931 patent reads: "A method of regulating the function of a gene in a
prokaryotic and eukaryotic cell which comprises introducing into said cell the DNA construct
of claim 1." Id. at 553. These types of claims are known as "method claims." See Mark D.
Janis, Who's Afraid of Functional Claims? Reforming the Patent Law's § 112, 6
Jurisprudence,15 SANTA CLARACOMPUTER&HIGHTECH. L.J. 231, for adiscussion ofmethod

claims.
130. Enzo, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
131. The genes were Escherichiacoli bacteria genes, specifically: outer membrane protein
A, C, and lipoprotein. Id. at 545.
132. Id. at 546-47.
133. Id. at 545.
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attempted in Inouye's lab. 1 34 Also, Inouye never successfully carried out antisense
regulation on prokaryotic cells, despite numerous attempts. 3 Other scientists in the
field reported extreme difficulty in successfully carrying out antisense regulation on
numerous genes.136 Perhaps most damning was the fact that during prosecution of the
Enzo patent, Inouye applied for a grant from the National Institutes of Health in order.
to determine the likelihood of success of antisense regulation in eukaryotic cells. 3
The general scientific consensus was that antisense regulation could only be
successful on a gene-by-gene basis requiring experimentation for each gene.'
Inouye's original patent application was rejected ten times on nonenablement grounds
before being granted."3 For all of these reasons, the Enzo patent was particularly
susceptible to nonenablement attack.
B. The NonenablementFinding
Calgene argued that Enzo's patent claims were too broad to be enabled because to
practice the patent beyond the examples given in the specification required "undue
experimentation by individuals with extraordinary skill in the art."'" The district
court used the Wands factors
analysis in determining that the Enzo patent was too
4
broad and not enabled.1 '
One of the most crucial Wands factors analyzed was the skill of those in the art.
Enzo argued that the extremely complicated nature of the art disclosed in the patent
required an extremely high skill in the art in order to practice the patent. 42 Enzo
reasoned that "where technology is very complex, one person will rarely practice an
invention outside of his or her specialty." 43
The district court decided that "ordinary skill" in this case was markedly less than
what Enzo postulated.'" The court determined that "ordinary skill" would be a
"junior faculty member with one or two years of relevant experience orapostdoctoral
scientist with several years of experience"' 45 because this was the skill level of the
majority of persons who carried out the research and experiments in antisense
technology. The court was unwilling to allow Inouye to claim a higher "ordinary

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Stuart K. Kim & Barabara J. Wold, Stable Reduction of Thymidine Kinase
Activity in Cells ExpressingHigh Levels ofAnti-sense RNA, 42 CELL 1.29 (1985).
137. Enzo, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 548.
138. Such case-by-case situations are not uncommon in biotechnology research due to the
extremely complex mechanisms involved in cellular organisms. Mechanisms of gene
expression can differ from cell to cell within one organism and from gene to gene within a
particular cell. See generallyMAIACINSKI & FRE1FELDER, supra note 1.
139. Enzo, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
140. Id. at 566.
141. Id.
142. See infra Part III.C.2.b (discussing the role that "the level of ordinary skill in the art"
has in enablement analysis).
143. Enzo, 14 F.Supp. 2d at 567.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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skill" level than his own lab had used in developing the antisense technology.'"
Closely connected to this factor was the question of undue experimentation.
Calgene pointed out all of the difficulty surrounding the Enzo patent prosecution and
the difficulty that other scientists had in practicing the patent. 47 Enzo argued that
some amount of experimentation is allowed under Wands, and that every possible
method for using antisense in every gene is not needed because the preexisting
knowledge in the art and the natural progression of the field would enable subsequent
users to use the antisense technology for all other genes. 4 However, the court
followed its reasoning in Genentech, Inc. v. Novo NordiskA/S 49 and held that the
specification must enable the patent, not the prior skill in the art.' The large amount
of evidence illustrating extreme difficulty in practicing Enzo's patent supported the
court's decision.
The court further analyzed the Wands factors and determined that direction and
guidance in the specification were inadequate, the examples given vere too narrow
and unreliable, the art was highly unpredictable, and the breadth of the claims at issue
were much broader than the specifications."' Under the Wands analysis, the district
court held the Enzo patent invalid for lack of enablement, ' and the Federal Circuit
subsequently affirmed that decision.'
C. Problems ofEnablement That Exist in the Wake of Enzo
Enzo was faced with the basic dilemma that faces all patent seekers in the
unpredictable arts. In order for the money spent developing the patent to be justified,
the patent must make sufficiently broad claims to cover trivial subsequent discoveries
in the art."s However, Enzo erred too far on the side of protection and lost its patent
for lack of enablement. The evidence surrounding this particular case did suggest that
Enzo was claiming much more than it actually deserved.' However, the decision is
important because it signals the Federal Circuit's continued application of its trend
to give teeth to the enablement requirement.' 56

146. Id.
147. Evidence of post-filing discoveries is only allowed in specific situations. Using postfiling discoveries is allowed to show a claim cannot be practiced without undue
experimentation, but an inventor cannot use post-filing discoveries to show that his patent
claim is enabled. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605 (C.C.P.A. 1977). Therefore, Enzo was not
allowed to save the claim by showing Inouye successfully used antisense technology in
eukaryotic cells after he filed for the patent, but Calgene was allowed to use post-filing
evidence to show lack of enablement. Enzo, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 568.
148. Id. at 566.
149. 108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
150. Enzo, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 566.
151. Id. at 568.
152. Id. at 566-69.
153. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
155. Enzo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 536.
156. See generally,Cannady, supranote 52 (arguing that In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed.
Cir. 1993), signals the enablement requirement has become quite strong).
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1.The Increasing Trend of Adding Bite
to the Enablement Requirement

The Federal Circuit has established a trend in which the enablement requirement
has become increasingly stringent" In particular, the Federal Circuit gave the
enablement requirement real bite in In re Wright. The Wright patents claimed
vaccines that would work against RNA viruses. 159 The patents claimed a specific
vaccine that had been developed, as well as general vaccines of the type."6 The
Federal Circuit held the broader claims involving the general vaccines invalid for lack
of enablement." In doing so, some commentators have argued that the "the court
elevated the standard for an enabling disclosure from a reasonable expectation of
success to a demonstrated success ...[and] could be interpreted as holding that the
specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention
without any experimentation, rather than without undue experimentation."' 62
Essentially, the Federal Circuit has done this in Enzo as well. Although the
Enzo court supports its holding with ample evidence of extreme difficulty in
practicing the broad patents, the decision could be interpreted as saying that a patent
will onlybe granted inthe unpredictable arts ifthe patentee has successfully practiced
every part of the claimed invention. Although this is not necessarily an incorrect
standard to set forth, the decision does signal that the enablement standard has
become increasingly stringent.
2. The Obviousness-Enablement Dichotomy Problem
This rise in the strength of the enablement requirement raises a few other important
problems. The patent applicant in the unpredictable arts is faced with internal tension
within the structure of the patent law. 63 The patent must be nonobvious to receive the
patent. The nonobviousness requirement of patent law requires that the invention
contain a truly inventive step, and that it be more than just a trivial extension of the
prior art.'' The nonobviousness requirement is in tension with the enablement
requirement

157. See generallyid. at 473; Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 10, at 37-44.
158. 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
159. Cannady, supra note 52, at 455.
160. In re Wright, 999 F.2d at 1560.
161. Id.
162. Cannady, supra note 52, at 473.
163. Id. at 461-62.
164. The Supreme Court outlined the requirements ofenablement in the quintessential case,
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1(1966). The court stated that the invention must be the
work of an inventor and not just a skilled mechanic. Id. at 11. The court also established
secondary considerations used to analyze obviousness: commercial success, long-felt but
unsolved need, failure of others, copying, and unexpected results. Id. at 17-18; see also
Greenwood v. Haitori Seiko Co., 900 F.2d 238, 241 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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a. Predictability
To pass the nonobviousness hurdle, the patent applicant must portray the invention
as being unpredictable or risk a finding that the invention be considered obvious with
respect to the prior art. However, after passing the nonobviousness requirement the
patent applicant must immediately redirect the portrayal of her invention as
predictable in order to pass the enablement requirement. The patent applicant must
walk a tight rope of sorts, portraying the invention as unpredictable enough to make
it nonobvious, but predictable enough to make it enabled. If the applicant errs too far
in one direction she will fall off of the tight rope into patent-rejection abyss.
The unique nature of biotechnology makes the danger of falling off the rope
especially high. Scientific research in general, and biotechnology in particular, is a
field that naturally builds upon previous discoveries in the field.' It is virtually
unheard of for a scientific discovery to arrive completely in a vacuum, independent
of any prior art discoveries, and for the new discovery to be completely predictable
and functioning with a high degree of consistency and dependability.' A much more
likely scenario is for a basic discovery to come forth (the general idea of antisense
regulation, for example) and that basic idea be expanded and promulgated by slow
and deliberate experimentation (the extrapolation of a known method of antisense
regulation in one gene to another gene or another species, for example). Therefore,
the patent applicant in biotechnology generally has an extremely small window in
which to characterize his invention as predictable or unpredictable.
Since the invention most likely is a continuation of a known prior art, the invention
is already at risk of failing for obviousness. To avoid patent denial for obviousness,
the applicant must immediately highlight the unpredictability of the art to portray his
or her invention as a truly inventive step. But, since the nature of biotechnology is
unpredictable, and the invention most likely will be the result of extended
experimentation in a small area of the prior art, the invention is already at risk of
failing the enablement requirement for lack of predictability. In order to avoid patent
denial for lack of enablement, the applicant must highlight the predictability of his
invention. This internal struggle inherent in patent-law doctrine leaves the
biotechnology patent applicant a precariously small gap in which to fit. 167
b. Person of Ordinary Skill
A second tension exists between obviousness and enablement. Both requirements
are subject to a "person of ordinary skill" measurement, but the persons of ordinary
skill are considered to have different skills between the two requirements.'" In
obviousness, the person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person having complete

165. As Isaac Newton once wrote: "If I have seen further it is by standing on ye shoulders
of giants." Letter from Isaac Newton to Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675/6), in 1 TuE CORRESPONDENCE
OFISAACNEwToN, 1661-1675, at 4162 (H.W. Turnbull, F.R.S. ed., 1959).
166. Winner, supranote 52, at613 ("The model of the lone scientist working by candlelight
among his bubbling retorts to come across a sudden and unexpected discovery no one could
have anticipated does not apply to modem innovation.").
167. See generally Cannady, supra note 52, at 461-62 (pointing out this dichotomy).
168. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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and instant knowledge of every prior art development. As developments occur, this
person is assumed to know of them immediately. This is the person to whom a patent
applicant must show the new invention would not be obvious. 69 However, as pointed
out in Enzo, the person of ordinary skill for enablement analysis is not assumed to
have perfect knowledge of the prior art Much to the contrary, the person of ordinary
skill is assumed not to have perfect knowledge of the prior art but to be somebody
who "thinks along the line of conventional wisdom in the art and is not one who
undertakes to innovate."'"7 The patent applicant is held to a double standard of the
"person with ordinary skill" measurement. The applicant must battle against the
hypothetical supercomputer brain during obviousness analysis and then during
enablement analysis must convince the courts the same "person" is not a bumbling
simpleton. Again, this dichotomy within the patent law places the applicant for a
biotechnology patent in a precarious situation.
3. The Need for Ad Hoc Analysis
The extreme complexity of biological systems makes enablement analysis nearly
impossible to apply other than on a case-by-case basis. No general guidelines for
patent-law enablement doctrine can be expounded because enablement is so deeply
dependent on the particular nature of each and every patent, and each and every
patent is so unlike all others. The Wands factors provide as much guidance as
possible but still allow a lot of latitude to argue each case on an ad hoc basis. This
complicated set of balancing factors and ad hoc examinations might be necessary in
order to preserve the quid pro quo so crucial to patent-law policy and to ensure that
the public is getting an adequate benefit in exchange for the inventor's limited
monopoly grant.
Of course, many areas of the law do not lend themselves well to easily applied
general doctrines, and courts must make ad hoc balancing determinations frequently.
However, the special problems inherent in the biotechnological arts make patents in
the field particularly susceptible to patent invalidation.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps because of the very fact that biotechnology is so complex and
unpredictable, the Federal Circuit should continue to add teeth to the enablement
requirement to prevent inventors from claiming an entire area of technology that they
have not sufficiently discovered. It was this idea of unfair taking that prompted the
debate about patenting ESTs nearly ten years ago.' 7 ' Whatever the Federal Circuit
decides to do with the enablement requirement in the future, a court must be aware
of the problems specific to biotechnology. Before automatically invalidating a patent,
a court should take into account the difficulties that patent applicants in
biotechnology are forced to face.
The Federal Circuit furthered the trend it started in In re Wright and has elevated

169. Winner, supranote 52, at 618.
170. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448,454 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
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the enablement standard from a reasonable expectation of success to an actual
demonstration of success.1 72 In a field of biotechnology that is as complex and
unpredictable as antisense technology, this is an acceptable approach. The best
method of patent protection for such a field is to protect antisense technology on a
gene-by-gene basis and force inventors to go through .the leg work that successful
antisense regulation requires. However, in a field that is not as unpredictable or
complex, the enablement standard should be relaxed to what.it was prior to In re
Wright and Enzo. Further, if antisense technology becomes routine in the future,
forcing each patent applicant to claim on a gene-by-gene basis would not achieve
what the court wanted the Enzo decision to achieve, namely, for each inventor to
solve the problems inherent in applying the technology to different genes. When no
problems exist in applying the technology to a broad array of genes, the enablement
requirement should be relaxed.

172. Cannady, supra note 52, at 473-74.

